Read about the pleading topics by our distinguished agents Keri Hartman (for the Applicant) and Kasia Nalewajko and Julian Georg (for the Respondent).
Read the arguments of Applicant and Respondent
States not party to the Non Proliferation Treaty are obviously allowed to acquire nuclear weapons!
Keri argues that Anduchenca did not violate customary international law when it acquired nuclear weapons, and that there is no customary international law requirement for states to negotiate nuclear disarmament.
In international law, states are allowed to decide on their own armament levels in the absence of specific prohibitions. States outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty are not bound by the treaty and might be politically criticised for their possession of nuclear weapons, but there is no legal obligation for them to not acquire nuclear weapons or disarm.
Furthermore, she argues that Rukaruku was not permitted to attack Anduchenca's nuclear-armed submarine under the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense. Pre-emptive self-defense is highly contested in international law. If it exists at all, it is only allowed if there is an imminent threat, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not constitute such an imminent threat allowing another state to attack Anduchenca.
Furthermore, Rukaruku violated international humanitarian law when it attacked an Anduchencan merchant ship on the high seas, killing seven civilians. International humanitarian law governs the rights and responsibilities of states in an armed conflict. Attacks are only allowed to be carried out against military objectives, states must take feasible precautions to limit collateral civilian damages and if such collateral damages occur, they must be proportionate to the overall military advantage anticipated. The attacks on a privately-owned supply ship violated the latter two principles, as Rukaruku didn't take any precautions in attack and killing seven civilians was clearly not proportionate to the military advantage of cutting off a submarine's supplies!
The Respondent respectfully asks this Court to adjudicate that Anduchenca violated international law by commissioning and operating the nuclear-armed submarine.
Kasia argues that customary international law prohibits states who are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from acquiring nuclear weapons. She contends that Anduchenca was never permitted to develop its nuclear-armed submarine, despite never signing or ratifying the NPT. States outside the NPT that have developed nuclear weapons have been condemned by the international community. There are numerous UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions condemning India, Pakistan and Israel for their nuclear weapons programmes.
Moreover, she argues that customary law requires all states that possess nuclear weapons to successfully negotiate nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN General Assembly have stated that this obligation stemming from Article VI of the NPT is not an obligation of mere conduct, but that of an actual result. State practice shows the decrease of global nuclear arsenals, following the conclusion of several bilateral and multilateral treaties and the establishment of ten nuclear-weapons-free zones. Statements by states, including the United States, Russia and even North Korea, as well as resolutions by the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council prove that these actions are done out of a shared belief that there is a legal obligation. Anduchenca therefore violated international law by operating its nuclear-armed submarine and stating that it would never dismantle it.
We submit that the Respondent complied with all principles of international humanitarian law governing the right of states in an armed conflict!
Julian submits that the attack on the nuclear-armed submarine Ibra and it's supply ship Covfefe was allowed not only under an Art. 42 Security Council resolution, but also under the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense.
An imminent threat is present, based on the deployment of a submarine with illegally acquired nuclear weapons that the Security Council has determined to be a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, statements by the authoritarian leader of Anduchenca clearly indicated that Anduchenca would use those nuclear weapons against Rukaruku. The threshold for an imminent threat was therefore met.
Moreover, he argues that Rukaruku has complied with all international humanitarian law (IHL) principles. Both the nuclear-armed submarine and its supply ship, even though it is not a military ship, were military objectives under IHL. Rukaruku took feasible precautions by trying to radio call the ship six times in half an hour before the attack. While it might seem unfair, the standard for feasible precautions is quite low. It is not required to launch warning shots before an attack. Futhermore, killing seven civilians was proportionate to the overall military advantage - depriving Anduchenca of its illegaly acquired nuclear-armed submarine. The International Court of Justice has stated that "the destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet." Rukaruku's actions were therefore permitted under international law.